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ABSTRACT
Despite significant advances in the terrorism literature since the September 11th attacks,
there remains very little research into the processes by which terrorism might come to a peaceful
end. The present study addresses this gap in the literature by investigating politicization, a
process by which terrorist organizations negotiate with authorities and the two parties enter a
peace agreement or otherwise agree to cease hostilities. The study explores the politicization
outcome as predicted by important organizational and behavioral characteristics that prior
literature identifies as affecting how terrorist groups end, including group size, organization
lifespan, target type for terroristic activities, and the breadth of organizational goals. The key
contribution of the current study is a focus on the presence of a non-violent political affiliate
(NVPA) within a broader terrorist organization and the role these affiliates play in predicting
politicization. Multivariate logistic regression analysis finds strong evidence of a relationship
between the presence of a NVPA and politicization, as well as between group size and political
cessation of terrorist activities. To elaborate on those findings, a brief case study/typology
illustrates these linkages using both historical and contemporary terrorist organizations as
examples. I conclude by discussing the role of NVPAs in understanding the terrorist
organizational life cycle broadly, as well as directions for future research that extend key themes
identified by the current study.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years since the September 11th attacks, most Americans have viewed terrorism as
necessarily destructive and inherently unforgivable. Indeed, the American public has recently
ranked terrorism as its number one foreign policy concern (Pew Research Center, 2016). This
should come as no surprise given the immense scope, both temporally and geographically, of
terrorism: major terrorist incidents have featured prominently throughout U.S. history, while
recent deaths related to terrorist attacks internationally have more than tripled since 2001 (GTD,
2020). Given the heightened threat posed by terrorist organizations in recent history,
governments and police agencies in the United States and abroad are increasingly pooling their
resources to develop successful counterterrorism strategies (Belasco, 2018). These strategies
have been varied in their results (Jones and Libicki, 2008), but point to an important – and
somewhat under-developed – question: when and under what conditions do terrorist groups
end/abandon violence?
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Despite advances made in describing why terrorist groups arise (Crenshaw, 1981;
Newman, 2005), how they attract resources (Crenshaw, 1981; FitzGerald, 2004; Rushchenko,
2019), and the geographic spaces in which they operate (Gruenewald, Drawve, and Smith 2019;
Onat and Gul, 2018), there remains little consideration of the process by which terrorist groups
end through negotiation. Indeed, policymakers often negotiate with terrorist groups (Cronin,
2011), and for good reason: globally, 43 percent of terrorist groups eventually decide to
negotiate, either with the state or with subnational groups, for a peaceful end to hostilities (Jones
and Libicki, 2008). However, empirical research exploring the creation of political channels
through negotiation remains relatively scarce. Particularly lacking is scholarship that engages the
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roles that novel organizational features and unconventional group affiliations play in facilitating
negotiation between the state and subnational authorities.
Such an empirical gap stems from a broader dearth of knowledge regarding the nonviolent means through which terrorist organizations are incorporated or connected to local,
regional, or state political institutions. Many terrorist organizations, for example, abandon
violence in exchange for legitimate political representation through a political party or a
parliamentary body (i.e. when the IRA agreed to cease its terrorist campaign in exchange for
representation in a reformed Irish government). Others negotiate a peaceful settlement with
authorities in exchange for political concessions without representation. The proposed study
builds on these observations and asks the following: how does non-violent political affiliation (or
the non-violent political affiliates of a terrorist) relate to politicization, or the negotiated end of
terrorism?
Answering this question has important implications for academic research and global
counterterrorism policy. First, examining the role played by non-violent political affiliates in
ending terrorist groups advances extant research by moving beyond the singular focus on the
violent end that has dominated prior studies (Abrahms, 2011; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Nilsson,
2018). Second, the current study also provides a foundation on which future research could build
by exploring the intricate ways in which terrorist groups are embedded in larger political
structures. Third, addressing this research question highlights the conditions under which
negotiation serves as a viable counter-terrorism strategy. Notwithstanding the philosophical
constraints of negotiation, should policymakers deploy strategies of negotiation judiciously, the
result could be considerable savings in terms of money and lives that would likely be lost in
military or anti-terrorism policing strategies.
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I propose an analysis that builds from prevailing narratives of terrorist group longevity,
including explanations that center on group size, target types, and breadth of goals across 112
international terrorist groups. At the same time, I move beyond prior research by also
investigating politicization – the process by which terrorist groups enter into a peace agreement
or other cessation of hostilities with a governing entity. Broadly, I seek to explore the role of
ancillary, non-violent political affiliates as a part of the politicization process, which speaks to
the ways in which terrorist groups court (or fail to persuade) constituents at the local or regional
levels in order to increase their bargaining power and leverage their popularity.
The project unfolds as follows. First, I draw on the terrorism literature to describe
foundational patterns of terrorism globally. Second, I provide a brief overview of the theoretical
underpinnings of my study rooted in organizational sociology/criminology, social movements
research, and political science. Third, I survey the relevant literature with particular attention to
the gaps in knowledge that remain unaddressed within empirical research. Fourth, I outline the
parameters of the current study, including my hypotheses, data, analysis, and results. This
includes particular attention to the existing secondary terrorism databases, including the End of
Terror, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and Non-Violent and Violent Campaign Outcomes
(NAVCO), that form the centerpieces of the current project. Fifth, I elaborate upon the results of
the quantitative analysis by providing a brief typology of terrorist groups relative to their
politicization and non-violent political affiliation, using case studies as contextual examples of
these processes. Finally, sixth, I conclude with a discussion of key findings relative to prior
research, directions for future empirical work, and their value for key stakeholders.
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THE EMPIRICAL BOUNDARIES OF TERRORISM
I begin the literature review with a brief overview of some of the recent criminological
literature on terrorism, both within the United States context and abroad. This literature, like that
of social movements and political science (discussed below), often investigates terrorism at the
event level, including evaluating the effectiveness of the counterterrorism strategies that law
enforcement agencies use. In general, criminologists find that certain law enforcement strategies
adopted by U.S. officials, when applied in suitable circumstances, can be effective
counterterrorism tools (Dahl, 2011). Recent research suggests that human intelligence (or
information gathered from community members or other law-enforcement agencies) is vital to
successful counterterrorism initiatives by law enforcement, especially when the terrorists are of
far-right ideology (Dahl, 2011; Difo, 2010; Klein et. al, 2019). Other counterterror actions tend
to be less effective: targeted killings or assassinations of major terrorist leaders, for example, do
not seem to meaningfully change the overall frequency of terrorist attacks, at least not in the
contexts of global jihadist terrorism and the Irish republican conflict (Carson, 2017; Gruenewald,
2017; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009). Still others find that terrorist groups tend to commit
attacks more frequently in areas that are characterized by high levels of social disorganization
(LaFree and Bersani, 2014).
Others find similar evidence when examining terrorist groups across the world. On the
one hand, this research generally shows that counter-terror strategies can be effective measures
for preventing terrorism when applied in the proper context. On the other hand, poorly managed
counterterror actions may actually increase terrorist groups’ capacity and willingness to carry out
attacks. LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), for example, find that British counterterrorism
initiatives resulted in further terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. Likewise, Dugan and
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Chenoweth (2012) argue that deterrence strategies that focus on punishments for committing
terrorism tend to be less successful than strategies that reward terrorists for abstaining from
violence. Recent research by Asal, Rethemeyer, Phillips, and Young (2018) notes that
governments which use force against larger terrorist groups increase the likelihood of future
terrorist attacks, whereas conciliatory counter-terrorism strategies tend to result in fewer attacks.
More broadly, this growing body of interdisciplinary research that includes
criminologists, political scientists, economists, and sociologists, explores the conditions under
which terrorist groups end. While this area remains somewhat underdeveloped compared to other
facets of terrorism research, recent studies yield important findings. For example, researchers
note that the ecosystem of violent non-state actors where a terrorist group is active condition how
and when terrorist groups end (Young and Dugan, 2014). They conclude that young terrorist
groups tend to end more frequently than more established groups, that groups in more populous
states tend to last longer, and that terrorist groups motivated by a religious ideology tend to be
more durable than others (Blomberg et. al, 2010; Blomberg et. al, 2011). Additionally, Young
and Dugan (2014) find that terrorist groups tend to survive longer in low-competition
environments (in environments that have fewer rival terrorist groups) and that the terrorist group
which is most active in a given environment is the most likely to endure. Taken as a whole, this
prior research demonstrates the importance of organizational activity and environmental
characteristics as they impact the ends of terrorist groups.
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
Rational Choice Theory
The present study focuses on the features that make terrorist groups more likely to
achieve politicization, the process by which terrorist organizations negotiate with authorities and
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agree to cease hostilities. That characteristics of organizations and their actions affect reception
and reaction dovetails with theories of organization-structure, including open-systems theory,
which is itself a variant of rational choice theory (Southerland and Potter, 1993). Pioneered in the
late 18th century by Cesarre Beccaria, rational choice theory argues that individuals are logical
and that they undergo some form of cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process (Clarke
and Cornish, 1986; Pratt 2008). The theory continues to enjoy widespread use, particularly in the
fields of economics and criminology. Rational choice theory is perhaps best summarized by
Ronald Clarke and Derrick Cornish in their observation that social behavior (in their case, crime)
is “the result of broadly rationalized choices based on analyses of anticipated costs and benefits”
(Clarke and Cornish, 1986, 6). Contemporary researchers have tested the theoretical groundwork
laid first by these scholars across numerous quantitative studies of non-normative action with
mixed results (Gul, 2009; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1996; Wright et al., 2004). While some
scholars find persuasive evidence of rational-decision making, at least in specific contexts such
as cheating and white-collar crime, others hold that rational choice theory withers under careful
empirical scrutiny (Gul, 2009; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1986; Paternoster and Tibbets, 2016;
Tibbets and Myers, 1999; Wright et al., 2004.)
More specific to the current study, terrorism researchers often draw on rational-choice
theory in their studies of terrorist activity (Abrahms, 2008; Crenshaw, 2017; Shughart, 2011). In
particular, they argue that, while a terrorist organization’s goals and methods may not themselves
be rational, their resource allocation schemes are often designed to maximize rewards with
minimal costs and that they tend to respond to counter-terrorism initiatives by modifying their
behavior so as not to be caught or killed (Shughart, 2011). Others argue that, while individual

6

decisions may not be rational, the collective sum of the decisions made by terrorist organizations
may be rational (Crenshaw, 2017).
Open-Systems Theory
In turn, those scholars working at larger aggregations within the sociology of
organizations have subsumed key insights from the rational choice perspective, including within
the study of terrorism. Much of this work coalesces under open-systems theory. Rather than
treating organizations as self-contained entities (Bastedo, 2004), proponents of open-systems
theory hold that organizations are affected by changes to their environments, including various
social, economic, and political forces (Southerland and Potter, 1993). Organizations that adapt to
environmental changes by modifying their behavior and/or organizational structures are more
likely to survive and achieve their goals, whatever those goals may be (Abrahms, 2008;
Southerland and Potter, 1993; Ullrich and Wieland, 1980). In contrast, those organizations with
structural and behavioral models poorly suited to particular social, economic, and political
environments wither and ultimately collapse (Mintzberg, 1979; Southerland and Potter, 1993;
Thompson, 1967). In short, open-systems theorists analyze organizations according to their
structures and activities in order to identify organizational configurations that are suited to
specific locations and contexts (Cressey, 1972; Lampe, 2016; Schelling, 1971).
Of particular relevance to the current study, a limited body of research establishes that
terrorist organizations operate within this open-system framework, especially when considering
how they begin, persist, and end. To be sure, until the 1990s, scholars and policymakers had, for
the most part, failed to consider the ways in which terrorist groups met their ends (Crenshaw,
1991). Martha Crenshaw’s groundbreaking (1991) analysis of the mechanisms that lead to the
demise of terrorist groups, unlike prior research, suggests that environmental factors (i.e.,
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government action against a group) are not always the determinants of organizational outcomes.
Instead, Crenshaw (1991) finds that, at least in some cases, terrorism defeats itself. Her insight,
in keeping with open-systems theory, introduces to terrorism research the possibility that the
behavior of terrorists and of their organizational structures impact how and when those terrorist
groups disband. Such insights have been most notably built upon by Seth Jones and Martin
Libicki (2008), as well as Audrey Cronin (2006), all of whom attempt to answer questions that
were first introduced by Crenshaw regarding how different facets of terrorist organizations
correlate with the longevity of those groups. I turn now to a brief review of the literature with a
particular focus on empirical scholarship examining how terrorist groups end.
REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE
Research on the end of terrorist organizations can generally be divided into two areas.
The first includes the work of researchers who suggest that the factors that lead terrorist groups
to end are primarily environmental, regardless of organizational structure or actions taken. The
second area of research tends to posit that the behavior and organizational structures of terrorist
groups are directly linked to the manner in which they end. There exists some overlap between
these subsections, as several of the researchers (e.g., Crenshaw [1991, 2011], Cronin [2006,
2011], Jones and Libicki [2008], and Tompkins [2015]) tend to prefer behavioral to
environmental explanations, but acknowledge that environmental factors (such as the response
by a state to terrorism) influence how and when a terrorist group ends.
Environmental Factors Condition Terrorist Longevity
Proponents of the first school of thought claim that environmental factors, or factors that
are external to the terrorist group, are directly linked to the manner in which a terrorist group
“ends.” This might include a host of different processes, like the political landscape or regime
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type of a given state, the counter-terrorism initiatives of a government, or even the physical
landscape of an environment (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Nilsson, 2018;
Pape, 2006). Core to this strain of the larger terrorism literature is the supposition that terrorist
groups will generally survive until they are acted upon by an external actor or social force
(Berman and Latin, 2008; Kydd and Walter, 2006). Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006)
elaborate this school’s argument: terrorism is a form of “costly signaling” in which terrorists,
who are too weak to impose their wills on state actors, communicate their resolve to achieve
their goals by accepting and inflicting heavy costs in lives and resources (p. 50; see also Berman
and Laitin, 2008). They and other researchers propose a causal logic summarized as follows:
terrorism succeeds when terrorists persuade a target audience to make concessions.
This involves two countervailing processes. On the one hand, terrorists compel
concessions when they demonstrate that they are capable of imposing heavy costs if their
demands are not met. Berman and Laitin (2008) reinforce this premise, contending that terrorist
violence consumes the resources of a target state. In this view, terrorists tend to be more
successful when the population or governing body that they target lacks the resources necessary
to defeat terrorism or when a governing entity or target population realizes that negotiating with
or even, in rare cases, capitulating to the terrorist organization might be “cheaper” than entering
a potentially protracted conflict. On the other hand, the specific response of the state to acts of
terrorism also has an effect (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Cronin, 2011; Tompkins, 2015).
Related research indicates that the extent and severity of a government or police
department’s response to terrorism can either extinguish or, in some cases, galvanize support for
the terrorist group among potential constituents (LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009; Tompkins,
2015). For example, if a government responds to acts of terror with indiscriminate violence, it
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might alienate citizens and increase the likelihood that it will need to grant concessions to the
terrorist organization as compared to if a government responds with appropriate, precise force
less likely to foster widespread discontent among non-combatants (Jones and Libicki, 2008;
Thompkins, 2015).
Others argue that the political structure of the state is directly linked to its capacity to
defeat terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Wilkinson, 2006). The findings of the literature
here are more mixed. While some scholars hold that democratic governments are uniquely
equipped to defeat terrorist organizations, others argue that authoritarian governmental structures
are better suited to quashing violence and political dissent when and where it arises (Eubank and
Weinberg, 1994; Nilsson, 2018; Wilkinson 2006). Still others see the political structure of the
state as a conditioning factor of the behavior of terrorist organizations. Pape (2006), for example,
argues that terroristic suicide aims to coerce specifically democratic countries to render
concessions, just as Nilsson (2018; see also Choi and Piazza, 2016; Wade and Reiter, 2007) finds
that the political structure of the state influences the targets that terrorists choose to attack. Still
others argue that the social conditions that prevail in a given context condition terrorism. Fahey
and LaFree (2014) find evidence that terrorist groups tend to be more active in states in which
there is a high degree of social disorganization. In summary, a sizeable literature emphasizes a
milieu of external features – including the nature of state and governmental structures and
responses to terrorism by them – that shape the life cycle of terrorist organizations, including
how they ultimately end.
Behavioral and Organizational Factors Condition Terrorist Longevity
In contrast to the perspective above, other scholars hold that a terrorist
organization’s choices and organizational structure are directly linked to how and why a terrorist
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group ends. That is, the behavior and organizational features of the terrorist organizations
themselves are the primary factors that shape the life cycles of those groups. Many of these
analyses focus on the targets of terrorist organizations. For instance, Abrahms (2011) notes that
terrorist organizations end because attacks on civilians cause policymakers to “dig in their
political heels” and deprive terrorists of their “preferences” (Abrahms, 2011, 584). Still others,
namely Jones and Libicki (2008), emphasize that a group’s size, the breadth of its goals (from
broad to narrow), in addition to its preferred targets (either civilian or non-civilian), are directly
related to the outcomes it will attain and, therefore, to the longevity of the group. Those terrorist
organizations that are larger, with narrower goals, and which avoid attacking civilians are more
likely to achieve victory and/or last longer; in contrast, smaller groups, with broader goals, that
attack civilians are more likely to end via either policing or military intervention (Jones and
Libicki, 2008).
Critically, it is the behavior and structure of the terrorist organizations themselves that
shape their life cycles as groups. Their size (Asal et al, 2018; Crenshaw 2010; Cronin 2011),
target choices (Abrahms, 2011; Kydd and Walter, 2006), ideology (Bloomberg et al, 2011)
expected goals (Jones and Libicki 2008) determine how a group ends. Indeed, Jones Libicki
(2008) observe substantial variation in the last stages of terrorist life cycles: over 40 percent of
such groups dissolve as a result of political incorporation (politicization), roughly 40 percent end
because of policing, while victory in achieving terroristic goals accounts for only about 10
percent of all organizational ends. Cronin (2009) reinforces Jones and Libicki’s (2008) research,
finding that most terrorist groups end due to some combination of coercive counter-terror
strategies and the mutual decision of terrorists and authorities to negotiate. Some researchers find
evidence that the use of terrorism itself conditions outcomes: terrorism tends to prolong the
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conflicts, but terrorists very rarely achieve their goals (Fortna, 2015). Terrorists simultaneously
decrease the likelihood that combatants will achieve durable peace agreements and increase the
duration of conflict (Asal et al, 2018).
Others hypothesize that the popularity of the goals a group pursues are related to how
and when that group will end. Cronin (2011) finds that certain goals, especially religious and
ethnonationalist objectives, tend to be more popular than others and that groups which pursue
these goals are more likely to be long-lasting and compel concessions from a target audience.
Some scholars find that non-violent political groups are more than twice as likely to achieve their
goals as are violent groups, reinforcing Abrahm’s contention that attacks on civilians tend to end
terrorist groups (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Thompkins (2015), for example, finds that nonviolent political movements that host a radical wing are slightly more likely to achieve their
goals than are purely violent political movements.
Gaps in Knowledge
While the literature reviewed above makes important strides in describing the lifecycle of
terrorist organizations, including how they end, several important issues remain unresolved. To
that end, I identify three gaps in the existing literature. First, no study to date has thoroughly
explored the organizational features and behaviors that lead terrorist groups to politicize. The
absence of research on this topic likely owes to the lack of data related to politicization. To my
knowledge, only Jones and Libicki (2008) have developed a dataset that includes measurable
behaviors related to political incorporation or engagement. This gap is critical because
politicization is the most common process by which terrorist groups end (Jones and Libicki,
2008). Understanding the causes of organizational and behavioral correlates of politicization will
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enable policymakers to better anticipate and potentially exploit politicization opportunities when
they arise.
Second, no study has investigated the role that non-violent political affiliates (NVPAs)
play within a broader terrorist organization. Rather, most of the prior literature on terrorism has
focused on violent, as opposed to non-violent, terrorist activities. As a result, not only has
research on politicization as an end to terrorism remained under-developed broadly as noted
above, but scholarship devoted to untangling how terrorist groups leverage other organizations
and political actors is specifically lacking. Yet, should NVPAs play an important role in the
politicization process, they may be key to counter-terrorism policies that specifically focus on
negotiation.
Third, very little previous work has applied open-systems theory to the politicization
process. Instead, much prior research focuses on the individual actions of specific terrorist actors
rather than on incorporating the broader open-systems framework that encourages careful
consideration for the structures and behaviors of the groups to which those individuals belong.
Filling this gap is critical as applying open-systems theory in the context of terrorist
politicization may enable researchers to explore the organizational features and behaviors that
can explain terrorist negotiation, while encouraging governmental actors to better understand the
circumstances under which terrorism ends (potentially non-violently through political means).
This thesis attempts to bridge these gaps by identifying some of the organizational
features, focusing in particular on the non-violent political affiliates of terrorist organizations that
are linked to politicization. In short, the current study clarifies the politicization process by
synthesizing existing secondary data to create a new, unique dataset for analysis into the
politicization process for many terrorist organizations. This analysis is guided by an open-
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systems perspective, which puts the focus on the internal and external structures and processes
affecting when and how terrorist groups end.
PARAMETERS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
Building on prior empirical research and theory, the current project aims to identify some
of the organizational features and behaviors that lead a terrorist group to politicize, or to enter a
negotiated settlement with the state or governing body. Specifically, my research question is as
follows: how does non-violent political affiliation relate to politicization (negotiated end)?
Data
To answer this question, I draw from three existing databases, listed in Table 1 below
(see also the appendix for more information on specific coding schemes in each database). First,
I draw on Jones and Libicki’s (2008) “End of Terror” dataset, which provides information on
group size, breadth of goals, and politicization for 648 terrorist organizations. Second, I use the
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset to create designations
for NVPAs. Third, I draw on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to determine a
terrorist organization’s preferred target type. Because most of these datasets are derivatives of
the GTD, the data that I use refer to terrorist groups from around the world for the period
extending from 1970 through 2019.
Table 1. Description of Secondary Data Sources
Database

Author(s)

Key Variables Provided
Politicization (DV)

“End of Terror”

Jones and Libicki (2008)

Group Size (IV)
Breadth of Goals (IV)
Group Lifespan (IV)

NAVCO 2.0

Chenoweth and Orion (2013)

NVPA (IV)

Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

LaFree and Dugan (2007)

Target Type (IV)

14

Unit of Analysis
The current study’s unit of analysis is the individual terrorist organization. Here, I borrow
the definition for terrorism used by Jones and Libicki (2008, 3): “terrorism involves the use of
politically motivated violence against non-combatants to cause intimidation or fear among a
target audience.” Similarly, terrorist groups are defined as: “a collection of individuals belonging
to a non-state entity that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives” (Jones and Libicki 2008, 3).
I select the organization as the unit of analysis for four reasons. First, organizations are
commonly treated as the unit of analysis in studies of social movements, which generally aim to
determine why certain social groups mobilize, how they garner resources, or clarify what
happens after a group or movement mobilizes. Second, I am working within an open-systems
theoretical framework. Open-systems theory is predicated on meso-level analysis. This
framework is well-suited to analysis at the group level. It moves beyond consideration of how
individual people may contribute to organizational outcomes and instead emphasizes the ways in
which those individuals operate collectively. Third, because organizations are frequently treated
as the unit of analysis in studies of international terrorism, there exists widely available data
surrounding terrorist organizations. Finally, fourth, the outcome of interest – politicization –
involves multitudes of different actors that, alone, lack the authority to establish political
outcomes. Instead, the study of politicization requires an organizational lens.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for the proposed study is politicization, which is coded
dichotomously (1 = terrorist group politicized) and defined as a terrorist group entering a
negotiated settlement with a governing authority and ceasing violence. Thus, every organization
included in the analysis is treated as either having politicized or as having failed to politicize.

15

As indicated above, the definition of politicization draws heavily on the opensystems/organizations perspective, while building directly on the work of Jones and Libicki
(2008), Crenshaw (1991, 2011), and Cronin (2006, 2011). This definition treats politicization as
a process of negotiation in which a terrorist organization rejects violence in exchange for legal
political status and/or state-rendered concessions. In my dataset, I evaluate politicization in
binary terms: each group I include is listed as either having politicized or as having not
politicized. I determine whether a group has politicized using the “End of Terror Dataset,1”
which lists the ways in which 648 terrorist groups ended (Jones and Libicki, 2008). If a group
rejects violence after securing a settlement with a state, I classify that group as having
politicized. The final dataset contains 200 terrorist groups. However, not all of the terrorist
groups included in the set have ended. Because of this, the regression analyses performed in the
present study draw on a sample of the 112 terrorist groups that have ended.
Focal Independent Variable: Non-Violent Political Affiliates
For the purposes of the current study, the focal independent variable is the presence of a
non-violent political affiliate (NVPA), coded dichotomously (1 = NVPA present) and defined as
the presence of ancillary organs or affiliates of terrorist organizations, including affiliated
political parties or courts, that pursue political objectives through non-violent methods. This
definition for NVPA derives from Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 6), in which such affiliates
pursue “a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective.”

1

Accessible via download at the following URL:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.html
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In order to practically identify NVPAs, I rely on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The creators of
this database collected information on the political affiliates and allied institutions of over 2,718
social movements and terrorist organizations (Chenoweth and Orion, 2013). If the NAVCO
dataset lists a terrorist group as having either an affiliate political party or an affiliate court, I
code that group as having an NVPA. Thus, an NVPA is coded as being present only if a relevant
affiliate is listed by the NAVCO dataset.
Additional Control Variables
Drawing from prior research on terrorist organizations, I also include several important
covariates of politicization specifically, or terrorist group longevity more broadly. These include
the group size of the organization (categorical from 0 – 100; 100 – 1,000; and more than 1,000)
as estimated in the “End of Terror” database; the breadth of goals for each terrorist organization,
which is defined using Jones and Libicki’s (2008) designation of narrow goals (e.g., regime
change, specific policy change) versus broad goals (e.g., establishment of an empire, social
revolution, etc.); target type, which uses the definitions employed by START and is coded in my
dataset as a ratio-level measure that corresponds to the proportion of a terrorist group’s targets
that were civilian. More specifically, civilian targets include any attacks on non-combatants that
are unaffiliated with the state (including facilities like airports, educational institutions, public
transport, businesses, and private citizens/property). Non-civilian targets commonly include
government officials, police, military personnel, infrastructure, other terrorist groups, or
unknown targets. Finally, I also include a control for the number of years that the organization
has been/was active.
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Hypotheses
Given the review of prior literature and operationalizations of my key variables, I also
generate the following guiding hypotheses.
● H1: A terrorist organization is more likely to politicize when it contains an NVPA.
Non-violent political affiliates serve three crucial functions. First, the political affiliate
contextualizes and legitimizes the terrorist group’s violent actions by crafting a narrative,
distributing propaganda, and delivering the group’s message and mission to potential
constituents. Second, the non-violent political affiliate is a prerequisite for diplomatic dialogue –
the state cannot communicate with a group that lacks the institutional infrastructure to answer its
calls. Third, the non-violent political affiliate provides civic and organizational connections in
otherwise barren areas. Furthermore, by identifying opportunities to achieve goals through
diplomacy, a NVPA simultaneously tempts the terrorist organization to politicize.
● H2: Larger terrorist organizations are more likely to politicize than smaller
terrorist organizations.
A terrorist group’s constituents must believe that the group is capable of achieving its
goals. Smaller groups tend to be more fragile (e.g., losing members has a larger impact on the
overall stability of the group). Therefore, a larger group is more likely to be seen as a stable,
capable arbiter of local affairs. Larger groups are also more likely to be perceived as having the
military strength to defeat the police or the state. Furthermore, neither the terrorists nor the legal
authorities will make concessions if they do not believe that they need to. If a terrorist group is
very small, authorities may not believe that its threats are credible; the state and the police are
unlikely to perceive any benefit in negotiating with a group that they believe they could defeat
through other means (i.e., without negotiating). Moreover, larger terrorist groups are more likely
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to develop NVPAs. As terrorist groups acquire more resources, they become more likely to
invest some of these resources in political wings.
● H3: Terrorist groups that pursue narrow goals are more likely to politicize than
those that pursue broad goals.
The terrorist organization’s goals must offer a plausible solution to the problems (or the
grievance) that its constituents face on the ground. If a group’s goals are broad (i.e., establishing
a transnational caliphate), the state is unlikely to grant the group a mutually acceptable
settlement. In contrast, if an organization’s goals are narrow enough that authorities can
plausibly grant it concessions, while simultaneously serving the desires of a community or
movement, the odds of politicization increase. Additionally, some of the effect of goals on
politicization may work in conjunction with NVPAs such that terrorist groups that contain
NVPAs are also more likely to pursue narrow goals. Because NVPAs are more sensitive to
opportunities for negotiation than is the militant wing on a terrorist organization, NVPAs are
likely to advocate for narrow goals that authorities can plausibly acquiesce to.
● H4: Terrorist groups that primarily attack non-civilian targets are more likely to
politicize than those that mainly attack civilian targets.
Per this last hypothesis, a terrorist group that mostly targets civilians risks ostracizing its
constituents. In turn, this underminesthe economic support and recruitment efforts needed to
sustain the political aspirations of a terrorist group, thereby undermining the peaceful, political
activities necessary for politicization (and the NVPAs who might be helpful in attaining
politicization). Terrorist groups that chiefly attack the state and others that its constituents
consider legitimate targets are more likely to muster popular political support. In other words, I
hypothesize that civilian targets are negatively correlated with politicization.
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RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
I begin by describing the sample of 112 terrorist organizations that have ended (i.e., are
no longer active) and that are the focus of my analysis. These are displayed in Table 2. For the
categorical variables, I present proportions/frequencies within each category, while means and
standard deviations are presented for all continuous variables.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Terrorist Organizations (n = 112)

Variable
Dependent Variable:
Politicization
Focal Independent Variable:
Non-Violent Political Affiliate (NVPA)

%

Mea
n

Std. Dev.

27.7%

-

-

33%

-

-

51%
25%
24%
85%
-

55.3
10.5

31.8
13.6

Additional Control Variables:
% Civilian Targets
Group size: small a
Group size: medium
Group size: large
Breadth of Goals: Narrow
Longevity b

a Serves as the reference category for multivariate analyses
b Provided in the original metric here but is logged for subsequent multivariate
analyses
I note five key findings. First, most terrorist groups do not politicize. In the sample of 112
groups used in the present study’s regression analysis, only 27.7 percent of groups politicized.
This indicates that, while politicization is not an especially rare outcome for terrorist groups, it is
not the norm. Most terrorist groups end through mechanisms other than politicization. Second,
most terrorist groups (67 percent) do not contain a non-violent political affiliate. Like
politicization, the presence of an NVPA within a terrorist group is relatively uncommon.
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Third, terrorist groups tend to be small. In the sample, 51 percent of groups contained
fewer than 100 members. Twenty-five percent contained between 100 and 1,000 members, and
only 24 percent contained over 1,000. Fourth, while the mean value for percent civilian targets
(55.3 percent) suggests that terrorist groups target civilians about as often as they target noncivilians, the high standard deviation (31.8) indicates that there exists a high degree of variation
between targets. This suggests that terrorist groups differ greatly in their selection of targets with
some groups primarily carrying out attacks on a single target type (including some that
overwhelmingly target civilians), while others disperse attacks more evenly between civilians
and non-civilians. Still others rarely attack civilians. Fifth, most terrorist groups tend to last two
years or fewer (not shown), but the average for duration (10.5) is driven up by outliers that, in
some cases, include groups have lasted more than 50 years. The standard deviation of longevity
(13.6) is higher than the mean, indicating that there is a very high degree of variance that is
largely attributable to the aforementioned outliers.
Bivariate Analysis
I turn next to an analysis designed to illustrate the one-to-one relationship between my
key outcome – politicization – and each of my focal independent variables. Table 3 displays
these results of chi-square tests for all categorical independent variables and binary logistic
regressions for the continuous variables (percent civilian, longevity). My focus here is on how
politicization varies across each unique dimension of a terrorist organization.
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Table 3. Bivariate Relationships Between Politicization and All Independent
Variables (n = 112)
Frequency Politicized
(%)
Non-Violent Political Affiliate
(NVPA)
Yes

20 (54%)

No

11 (15%)

Test for Diff.

19.20 p <
.001

Additional Control Variables:
% Civilian Targets
Group size: small
Group size: medium

-

-1.11
.05

p>

5 (16%)
10 (32)%

Group size: large

16 (52%)

24.39 p <
.001

Breadth of Goals: Narrow
Breadth of Goals: Broad

29 (94%)
2 (6%)

2.39

p > .05
p<

-

0.63
.001

Longevity

Note: The statistical significance of politicization differences for categorical
variables (NVPA, Group Size, Breadth of Goals) are estimated using chi-square
tests, while the relationship between continuous variables (Civilian Targets,
Longevity) and politicization are estimated using bivariate logits.
I note five key findings. First, most of the terrorist groups in the sample that politicized
contained an NVPA (54 percent). Only 15 percent of groups politicized but did not contain an
NVPA. The chi-square test yields a value of 19.2, which is statistically significant at the .001
level, indicating that there exists an association between NVPA and politicization: those groups
with a non-violent political affiliate are more likely to politicize. Second, the bivariate logit
regression coefficient for percentage of civilian targets (-1.11) is not statistically significant at
the .05 level. The percentage of group’s attacks on civilian targets is unrelated to politicization.
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Third, larger groups tend to politicize more often, as indicated by the frequency
politicized column in Table 3. Groups containing more than 1000 members politicized more
frequently that did groups of any other size, followed by those group between 100 and 1000,
with smaller groups (less than 100 members) politicizing less frequently. The chi-square statistic
here (24.39) is also significant at the .001 level, again suggesting a statistically significant
association between group size and politicization. Fourth, the chi-square value for breadth of
goals (2.39), is not statistically significant at the traditional p<.05 level, indicating that breadth of
goals is unrelated to the likelihood of politicization. This may be due to a lack of variation in the
breadth of goals with most groups seeking more modest changes and, therefore, reducing the
comparisons against groups with broader goals in terms of their politicization. Finally, the
logistic regression coefficient for longevity (.63) is statistically significant at the .001 level,
suggesting the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between longevity
and politicization. As the number of years a terrorist group is active increases, the likelihood of
politicization increases.
Multivariate Models: Predicting Politicization
While instructive, the bivariate relationships described above fail to consider important
differences across terrorist groups that might simultaneously impact the likelihood of
politicization (e.g., larger groups may be more likely to include a non-violent affiliate in ways
that increase politicization generally). Thus, to address my primary research question – how does
non-violent political affiliation impact the likelihood of politicization? – I focus now on building
a series of multivariate models that predict politicization as a function of NVPA and other
critical terrorist group characteristics that might affect also impact politicization or non-violent
political affiliation. These results of which are shown below in Table 4.
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I present the models in two steps. The first model replicates Jones and Libicki’s (2008)
study by including group size (medium and large categories), civilian target proportion, breadth
of goals, and longevity. The second model includes the same variables with the addition of
NVPA as the focal independent variable of the present study.
Table 4. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Politicization Among Terrorist
Organizations as a Function of NVPA and Additional Control Variables (n =
112)
Model 1

Model 2

-

3.748*

% Civilian Targets

0.406

0.243

Group size: medium

4.229*

3.804

10.042**

6.301*

Breadth of Goals: Narrow

0.559

1.537

Longevity (ln)

1.178

1.028

Psuedo R2
Model X2

0.177
27.42

0.245
33.04

Non-Violent Political Affiliate (NVPA)

Group size: large

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Model 1 reveals statistically significant, positive relationships between group size (both
medium and large versus small) and politicization, such that both medium and large groups are
more likely to politicize than are small groups (p<.05 and p<.01, respectively). In the sample,
terrorist groups of medium size are over four times more likely to politicize than groups of small
size (the reference category), while large groups are over ten times more likely to politicize than
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small groups. No other terrorist group characteristics are statistically significant in model 1. The
R2 value for Model 1 is .177, indicating that just under 18 percent of the variation in
politicization can be explained by accounting for civilian targets, group size, breadth of goals,
and longevity of terrorist organizations.
Model 2, which incorporates NVPA into the previous model, also finds statistically
significant relationships between group size and politicization. However, unlike model 1, the
second model does not yield a statistically significant odds ratio for the medium group size, and
the odds ratio for the large group size decreased from 10.042 to 6.301 (and the statistical
significance declines to p<.05). That is, large groups are over six times more likely to politicize
than small groups, net of other key group characteristics and the presence of non-violent political
affiliates. Most importantly, model 2 also reveals a statistically significant relationship between
NVPA and politicization (p<.05). The odds ratio is 3.748, indicating that terrorist groups that
contain an NVPA are almost four times more likely to politicize than groups that do not contain
an NVPA, net of other important terrorist group characteristics. The model R2 value also
increased from .177 (model 1) to .245 (model 2), indicating that the model explains an additional
7 percent of the variation in politicization with the inclusion of non-violent political affiliation
(this is confirmed by chi-square model fit statistics).
Overall then, the current study finds strong evidence of a relationship between NVPAs
and politicization, as well as group size and politicization. Table 2 yields insight as to what the
average group in the sample looks like – the typical terrorist organization did not contain an
NVPA, did not politicize, targeted mostly civilians, contained 100 or fewer members, and lasted
for about 10 years (though this value is driven up significantly by outliers). The bivariate
statistics find that NVPA, group size, and longevity are associated with politicization. The
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multivariate statistics reveal that NVPA and the large group size share a statistically significant
relationship with politicization, indicating that these two IVs as especially important to the
politicization process.
A TYPOLOGY OF TERRORIST GROUP ENDS: NVPA AND POLITICIZATION
To illustrate the lifecycle relationship between NVPA and politicization described in my
quantitative models above, as well as how different environmental and organizational conditions
might contribute to the politicization process, I create below a typology of the terrorist
organizations included in this dataset. This is illustrated in Table 5. This typology contains four
categories with the overall goal of providing specific examples of the ways that terrorist
organizations do (and do not) engage non-violent political affiliates and do (and do not)
politicize as a means of ending. The first cell includes terrorist groups that contained an NVPA
and politicized, a condition met by 23 groups (16.5 percent of all groups that officially ended at
the time of this study). The second type includes terrorist groups that contained an NVPA but did
not politicize, criteria shared by 19 groups (13.7 percent of all groups examined). The third type
includes groups that did not have an NVPA but did politicize. This cross-classification contains
only 14 groups, making it the least common scenario in this data (10.1 percent of all groups
examined). The final type includes terrorist groups that did not have an NVPA and did not
politicize. This is by far the most common scenario, present for 83 groups (59.7 percent of all
groups examined). In the pages that follow, I briefly describe the organizational features and
events that led to the end for some specific terrorist groups in each cell of Table 5.
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Table 5. Typologies of Terrorist Groups by NVPA and Politicization
Contained an NVPA and Politicized
Contained an NVPA, Did Not Politicize
N=20 (17.9%)
N=17(15.2%)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Mozambique National Resistance
Khmer Rouge
Movement (RENAMO)
Did Not Contain NVPA, and
Did Not Contain an NVPA, Did Not
Politicized N=11(9.8.%)
Politicize
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
N=68(57.1%)
Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba
Andres Castro United Front (FUAC)
and Uraba (ACCU)
Aum Shinrikyo
Type One: Groups That Contained an NVPA and Politicized
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) (active as a terrorist organization from 1969 to 2005)
waged a near 30-year violent campaign to end British rule of Ireland and establish a reunified
Irish republic. The organization carried out attacks in Northern Ireland, as well as in England, on
both civilian and government targets. The IRA grew out of a non-violent political group bearing
the same name and continued to enjoy the original IRA’s political affiliates despite being
officially independent from them. Chief among these NVPAs was Sinn Fein, an Irish political
party that shared the IRA’s objectives. After a years-long (and largely unsuccessful) campaign
by the IRA to establish an independent, unified Irish state, Sinn Fein entered negotiations with
English officials in 1997 that would ultimately lead the organization to abandon violence for
political representation in a reformed government. Drawing on the themes of my quantitative
analysis, the IRA may have been able to politicize for four reasons. First, the organization’s
NVPA, Sinn Fein, established the conditions that enabled the IRA to negotiate, making
politicization possible. The IRA also mostly refrained from attacking civilians (60 percent of its
attacks were against non-civilian targets), which may have helped it win popular support. Third,
the IRA pursued narrow, achievable goals, which made negotiation with English officials
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tenable. Fourth, the organization was sufficiently large that the English government saw its
threats as credible.
Similarly, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) also exemplifies
this organizational type. RENAMO, a right-wing opposition movement, was founded in 1976 in
a bid to overturn leadership of Mozambique by a Marxist political party (FRELIMO). Despite
targeting mostly civilians (63 percent of attacks), RENAMO maintained several NVPAs both in
the territories it controlled and abroad. In 1992, after a nearly 15-year terrorist campaign that had
resulted in civil war, FRELIMO and RENAMO, through non-violent affiliates, reached a peace
agreement that granted RENAMO legitimate political status in exchange for agreeing to abandon
violence. The ability of RENAMO to achieve politicization may rest on three characteristics of
its organization and activities. First, and perhaps most importantly, RENAMO used several
NVPAs that helped initiate negotiations with FRELIMO. Second, the organization pursued a
relatively narrow objective in the form of regime change. Third, RENAMO contained over 1,000
members at its peak, making it a large enough group that opposition may have been forced to
take it seriously.
Taken together, both the IRA and RENAMO are examples of what my own quantitative
analysis finds to be an important process. That is, terrorist groups that engage non-violent
political affiliates leverage them strategically to end through politicization. Indeed, the two
examples illustrate that other features still matter (including groups size and the breadth of
goals), even when some factors (e.g., civilian targets) differ more prominently.
Type Two: Groups That Contained an NVPA, but Did Not Politicize
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched a three-year campaign of
terrorist violence that would encompass most of Liberia in 1992. The NPFL’s violent attacks,
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which targeted civilians in nearly 70 percent of cases, catalyzed the Liberian Civil War, which
lasted until 1996. Despite its large membership (estimates place its membership at over 1,000)
and a host of NVPAs established mainly in the territory the group conquered, the NPFL did not
politicize. This may owe to the fact that the group usually attacked civilians, often committing
massacres and using torture in ways that alienated Liberian civilians. In turn, the Liberian
government was less willing to negotiate with NFPL leadership and the group ended in 1995
when it defeated the government across most of Liberia and achieved victory.
As another example of this type, the Khmer Rouge began its terrorist activities in 1951.
Initially doubling as a Cambodian communist guerilla movement and political party, the Khmer
Rouge had an NVPA from its founding. The organization overthrew the Cambodian government
in 1975 and became the ruling party of Cambodia. As Cambodia’s governing faction, the Khmer
Rouge continued to use terrorism to maintain control of the country. The organization’s attacks
targeted civilians in 72 percent of cases according to the Global Terrorism Database, which may
have alienated the Cambodian public and international spectators. The Khmer Rouge were
expelled from Cambodia after a Vietnamese invasion of the country in 1979, which caused the
organization to rapidly lose power and support. After a protracted period of decline, the
organization ceased its terrorist activities in 1998 without ever politicizing. Like the NFPL, the
Khmer Rouge was a large organization with a built-in NVPAs (including most of the Cambodian
government itself from 1975-1979.
The cases of the NPFL and the Khmer Rouge exemplify some of the means by which
terrorist groups might fail to politicize even when NVPAs are present. For the NPFL,
politicization may not have occurred because the NPFL did not have to negotiate. The group did
not need to leverage its NVPAs in order to achieve a compromise because compromise itself was
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unnecessary. Similarly, the Khmer Rouge may not have used NVPAs during its early years
because it did not need them to gain control of most of Cambodia, at least temporarily. Both the
NPFL and the Khmer Rouge were large enough to gain control of their respective countries as
well as very willing to engage in brutal attacks on civilians, highlighting group size and target
type as potentially important characteristics of terrorist groups that contained NVPAs, but did not
politicize.
Type Three: Groups That Did Not Contain an NVPA, but Politicized
Northern Ireland’s Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) emerged in 1996 in response to
attacks by the IRA and related Irish republican groups. The LVF aimed to thwart Irish
republicanism and to undermine the IRA’s efforts to unify Ireland and Northern Ireland. Unlike
the IRA, the LVF did not have NVPAs and did not exercise restraint in its target selection. The
LVF targeted civilians in nearly 90 percent of its attacks (who were disproportionately Catholic).
The LVF began to commit attacks less frequently in the months following the IRA’s
politicization. The LVF managed to similarly politicize in spite of its relatively modest size
(between 100 and 1,000 members ), its propensity to target civilians, and its lack of NVPAs
because the organization agreed to a ceasefire following the Good Friday Agreement. The
organization also pursued relatively narrow goals, which may have made mutually acceptable
negotiation with the authorities more possible. Most importantly, the opportunity for negotiation
opened by IRA affiliates enabled the LVF to enter a ceasefire agreement in spite of its civilian
targets, modest size, and lack of NVPAs.
The Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) was a Colombian terrorist
organization formed in 1994 in response to frequent kidnappings carried out by left-wing guerilla
movements operating in the country’s rural regions. Ostensibly a group concerned with defense
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of territory, the ACCU often collaborated with Colombian drug traffickers and carried out
attacks on left-wing activists. The group contained over 1,000 members at the height of its power
and selected civilian targets in 69 percent of its attacks. While ACCU did not have NVPAs, its
predecessor organization had collaborated with Colombian police to track down and ultimately
kill Pablo Escobar. The ACCU formally politicized and came to an end in 2006 after negotiating
a peace agreement with the Columbian government. Key for my purposes, the ACCU may have
managed to politicize for three reasons. First, it was composed of a large and powerful network
of paramilitary groups, many of which were deeply tied to Columbian drug traffickers,
presenting a substantial threat to the Colombian government. Second, ACCU members had
opened diplomatic channels with the Colombian government when they collaborated with police
to kill Pablo Escobar, which may have offset the group’s lack of NVPAs. Third, the organization
pursued a relatively modest goal (protecting rural regions of the country that were tied to the
Colombian drug trade), which made negotiation with the Colombian government tenable.
The LVF and the ACCU present interesting cases for the purposes of this analysis.
Despite the fact that neither group contained a NVPA, they both politicized. Moreover, while the
ACCU was a large organization, the LVF only contained between 100 and 1,000 members,
indicating that a large group size is not a prerequisite to politicization. The two groups share a set
of relatively narrow goals, as well as external circumstances that may have offset the absence of
an NVPA. For the LVF, the Good Friday Agreement may have provided access to the
negotiation that would otherwise have never materialized. Similarly, the ACCU had previously
collaborated with authorities, which may have enabled leadership to open communication with
the Colombian government.
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Type Four: Groups That Did Not Contain an NVPA and Did Not Politicize
The Andres Castro United Front (FUAC) was a Nicaraguan terrorist organization that
was active from 1995 to 2002. One among many Marxist guerilla organizations active in
Nicaragua at the time, FUAC aimed to improve the living conditions of residents of the country’s
poorest regions. FUAC was of medium size, containing over 100 members at its peak. The group
targeted non-civilians in the vast majority of its attacks (75 percent). Despite the organization’s
relative restraint in its target selection and moderate size, FUAC did not politicize. Relative to
my own study, the group lacked an NVPA and remained relatively small. When the Nicaraguan
government did attempt to initiate peace talks with the FUAC, the organization kidnapped
negotiators and peace talks were subsequently discontinued. Following years of targeted
assassinations of FUAC leaders by the Nicaraguan government after the failed peace talks,
FUAC eventually disintegrated in 2002.
Aum Shinrikyo was a multiregional terrorist organization that was active from 19842000. Initially a Japanese spiritual movement or religious organization, Aum Shinrikyo
expanded quickly, spanning seven countries and containing over 10,000 members at its peak.
Members began to carry out terrorist attacks in the late 1980s, mainly targeting civilians. The
group attempted to manufacture chemical weapons through the early 1990s, which culminated in
a sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995. Following the attack, the Tokyo police launched
an aggressive policing campaign that resulted in the arrest of much of the organization’s
leadership. The group had largely abandoned terrorist activities by the end of 2000. Aum
Shinrikyo likely failed to politicize for three reasons. First, the organization’s goals were
extremely broad in trying to initiate Armageddon through its chemical weapons attacks. This
naturally made it difficult for authorities to propose an acceptable settlement to the organization.
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Second, Aum Shinrikyo targeted civilians in over 60 percent of its attacks, which made them
unpopular among Japanese civilians and left the Japanese government with little incentive for
negotiation. Third, and central to my own analysis, Aum Shinrikyo did not have any NVPAs and
lacked the institutional infrastructure through which authorities could have initiated negotiations.
The two groups differ significantly across the independent variables that are identified as
important in this analysis. Whereas Aum Shinrikyo was a massive group that pursued broad
goals and frequently targeted civilians, the FUAC was a medium-sized group that pursued
narrow goals and mainly targeted non-civilians. For this analysis, that the groups both lack an
NVPA is key to understanding their inability to politicize: while the two organizations vary
significantly in terms of other key variables, the lack of an NVPA may be the common factor
that prevented either from politicizing.
DISCUSSION
Terrorism remains a top foreign policy concern in the United States (Pew Research
Center, 2016), an unsurprising observation given the specific resonance of the September 11th
and other recent attacks, as well as the tripling of deaths related to terrorist attacks internationally
since 2001 (GTD, 2020). In turn, terrorism research has grown tremendously (Freilich,
Grunewald, and Mandala, 2019), both domestically and abroad, including scholarship devoted to
understanding when and under what conditions terrorist groups end. Much of this recent
literature has focused on the environmental conditions, most notably counter-terror initiatives by
authorities, that lead terrorist groups to end. Yet, no study to date has explored the role of
politicization as a key mechanism by which hostilities may cease, particularly as the structure of
terrorist organizations and the decisions that terrorist groups make might shape the politicization
process. By applying an open-systems framework to the end of terrorism literature, the current
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study sought to highlight the importance of organizational structure and behavior within the
terrorist lifecycle. My own analysis identified two key features of the politicization process:
group size and the presence of a non-violent political affiliate (NVPA). In so doing, the current
study sought to extend current research by introducing the possibility that novel organizational
structures and terrorist political affiliates contribute significantly to the way in which terrorist
organizations end.
I noted six key findings. First, both politicization and non-violent political affiliation
were found to be uncommon. For example, politicization – the negotiated end of a group through
a peace agreement or other cessation of hostilities with a governing entity – was observed for
only about a third of all groups. Instead, the majority of terrorist organizations ended through
other means (e.g., policing, military force, victory). Likewise, non-violent political affiliates
were also found to be somewhat uncommon: only about a third of all terrorist groups affiliated
with a non-violent political party or organization.
Second, most terrorist organizations were small and attacked a diverse array of targets.
Over half of all groups had fewer than one hundred members, while targets were civilians more
than fifty percent of the time for the typical terrorist organization (though with substantial
variability across groups). Meanwhile, the average group lasted just over a decade.
Third, and central to my specific research question, multivariate logistic regression
models revealed that NVPAs play a crucial role in the politicization process. Specifically,
terrorist organizations with a non-violent political affiliate were substantially and significantly
more likely to politicize, other organization and behavioral covariates held constant. This finding
moves forward the current literature by identifying a vital indicator of politicization that, to this
point, has been absent from discussion. The importance of NVPAs to the political process
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corroborates the more suppositional conclusions of prior research that emphasize the end of
terrorism and violent social campaigns through negotiation and politics (Cronin, 2009;
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Thompkins, 2015).
Fourth, other factors were also found to impact the likelihood of politicization. In
particular, larger groups (especially those containing over 1,000 members) appeared to be much
more likely to politicize than smaller groups. This conclusion supports that of prior researchers
who argue that terrorists tend to be more successful when they are capable of inflicting heavy
costs on their targets (Kydd and Walter, 2006; Berman and Laitin, 2008). Here, politicization can
be understood as the recourse of states who are unable to defeat terrorism through policing or
military strategies as a function of terrorist group recruitment and membership reflected by larger
groups.
Yet, fifth, I did not find evidence that the targets a terrorist organization chose to pursue
were related to politicization. While this conclusion does not suggest that targeting civilians is a
successful strategy relative to other tactics, it does indicate that the targeting of civilians does not
necessarily affect the possibility of successful negotiation once other factors are taken into
account. This finding is somewhat at odds with Abrahm’s (2011) contention that the targeting of
civilians discourages authorities from making concessions. In the present study, terrorists who
targeted civilians were not found to be significantly less likely to politicize net of NVPA and
other factors. At the same time, it was beyond the scope of the current study to examine whether
terrorism is a more successful strategy than other tactics that do not involve attacks, including on
civilians (such as peaceful protest). Instead, the conclusion here cannot adjudicate the notion that
terrorism might be a less effective strategy than more peaceful alternatives (Chenoweth and
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Stephan, 2011; Thompkins, 2015), though my findings also suggest that other factors may offset
the target selection of these groups.
Similarly, sixth, I found that the nature of the goals a terrorist organization chose to
pursue, be they narrow or broad, were unrelated to politicization. This is not to say a group’s
goals do not affect the manner in which it will end, but it does suggest that other organizational
features are more important to the politicization process. As such, this conclusion does not
necessarily contradict Jones and Libicki’s (2008) finding that terrorist groups that pursue
narrower goals are more likely to achieve victory as politicization is a distinct outcome.
Revisiting the Typologies: Exceptions to the NVPA-Politicization Link
These findings were further clarified by disaggregating terrorist groups into a typology of
NVPA and politicization in order to illustrate specific instances (or not) of non-violent affiliation
and politicization. It demonstrates, for example, that while NVPAs can be crucial to the
politicization process, an NVPA does not guarantee politicization. The typology revealed that
while the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Mozambique National Resistance Movement
(RENAMO) leaned heavily on their NVPAs in order to start negotiations, the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Khmer Rouge did not need to negotiate using their own NVPAs as
they were strong enough to achieve victory (though temporary in the case of the Khmer Rouge).
Moreover, of the four groups listed above, only the IRA refrained from targeting civilians in
most of its attacks. This suggests that groups that are powerful enough to achieve victory might
have a greater propensity to attack civilians. The discrepancy in terms of outcome between these
two scenarios indicates that, while NVPAs can facilitate negotiation, some groups that are
sufficiently large and/or powerful might forego negotiation if they believe they can achieve their

36

goals without needing to compromise. This, in turn, suggests that larger terrorist organizations
might favor strategies of victory rather than politicization.
Other groups managed to politicize without the help of an NVPA, suggesting that an
NVPA is not a prerequisite to negotiation either. For example, the Loyalist Volunteer Force
(LVF) and Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) both managed to enter dialogue
with authorities despite lacking non-violent affiliates. The ACCU and the LVF resembled
RENAMO in terms of their targets, size, and goals, but they lacked an NVPA. For these groups,
diplomatic channels were opened by other means. In the case of the LVF, the Good Friday
Agreement, secured in part by the IRA’s NVPAs, enabled the group to seek reconciliation with
authorities. In the case of the ACCU, the group had previously cooperated with authorities and
likely retained access to government contacts. These observations also mean that, although
NVPAs often create opportunities for negotiation, there exist other methods of initiating the
peace process. That both the LVF and the ACCU targeted mostly civilians reinforces the
quantitative finding that target type is unrelated to politicization.
The final scenario included in the case study, groups that did not contain an NVPA and
did not politicize, further reinforces the notion that NVPAs are vital to the politicization process
by illustrating those organizations that neither engaged affiliates nor peacefully negotiated their
ends. For instance, even when groups pursue relatively narrow goals and avoid attacks on
civilians (as was the case for the Andres Castro United Front), the lack of an NVPA can still
undermine the potential for negotiation. Interestingly, of the eight groups included in the case
study, only one (Aum Shinrikyo) pursued broad goals. While it is difficult to observe patterns
related to breadth of goals due to the rarity of broad goals, the case of Aum Shinrikyo indicates
that broad goals may similarly diminish the prospects of negotiation.
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The current study makes several important contributions to the terrorism literature, but
there remain at least three ways to extend this line of inquiry. First, the total sample size for the
study is small, with only 112 international terrorist groups included in the final regression
analysis. While studies of terrorist groups frequently rely on relatively small samples, the current
study would generate more robust findings were the sample larger. This small sample owes
mainly to the lack of data surrounding NVPAs and politicization, which require detailed studies
of the organizations and their histories to construct. Future studies might benefit from drawing
on alternative data that can be used as a proxy for NVPA.
Second, the current study lacks diversity for the measurement of breadth of goals. Only
14 of the 112 total groups pursued broad goals, which makes it difficult to assess the effect of
broad goals on politicization. Researchers who seek to continue investigating the politicization
process may wish to identify and include more groups that pursued broad goals or to delineate
organizational objectives with more variability.
Third, the relationship between NVPAs and politicization is undermined by a potential
issue with time. While the regression analysis offers evidence of a relationship between NVPAs
and politicization, it is not clear whether the NVPA precedes the politicization process. It is
possible, for example, that NVPAs often develop during politicization rather than being the
catalysts of it. Future researchers might offset this problem if they can identify the time frame in
which the terrorist developed an NVPA relative to when negotiations with authorities began.
Alternatively, using time series methodology and lagged predictors might similarly provide
advantages in characterizing this process within the proper order.
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The present study offers two important insights for policymakers. First, negotiation with
terrorists is a relatively common and often successful strategy for ending terrorist campaigns.
There may exist a political cost to negotiating with terrorists, but politicization offers an
opportunity for authorities to end terrorism peacefully. While philosophical and political costs to
negotiation will remain a concern, the negotiated ends of terrorist organizations constitute viable
routes for stakeholders to take.
Second, negotiations are more likely to be successful when a terrorist organization is
large and contains an NVPA. These two variables constitute valuable indicators that successful
negotiation with a terrorist group is possible and should be considered by policymakers who are
contemplating strategies involving negotiation. Policymakers might more comfortably assume
the risk of negotiating with terrorists when these conditions are met, as the potential
philosophical/political costs of negotiating with terrorists are offset by the possibility of
negotiating a peaceful end to the violence.
The current study has explored the process of politicization, an important dimension of
the scholarship on the end of terrorism that has heretofore gone underdiscussed. While the
present study offers a starting point for researchers who are interested in the politicization
process, there remains a great need for additional research into the conditions under which
terrorist groups end peacefully, including through their political and organizational strategies.
Should future researchers continue this investigation, they will enrich our understanding of the
terrorist lifecycle and, in so doing, arm policymakers with the information they need to combat
terrorism with as little loss of life as possible.
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES, CLASSIFICATION, MEASUREMENT

Variable

Source

Coding

Name in
Politicization
Dataset

● Dichotomous
● Categorical

● 0: Did Not
Politicize
● 1: Did
Politicize

● Politicization

● 0: Group Does
Not Have
NVPA
● 1: Group Has
NVPA

● NVPA

● 0: 1-100
● 1: 101-1000
● 2: 1001-10000
● 3: >100000

● Size

Type

Politicization
(DV)

● End of
Terror
Dataset

Non-Violent
Political
Affiliate
(FOCAL IV)

● NAVCO 2.0
● How
Terrorism
Ends Dataset

● Dichotomous
● Categorical

Group Size
(IV)

● End of
Terror
Dataset

● Ordinal
● Categorical

● 0: Narrow
Goals (Regime
Change,
Policy
Change)
● BoG
● 1: Broad Goals
(Empire,
Social
Revolution)

Breadth of
Goals
(IV)

● End of
Terror
Dataset

● Dichotomous
● Categorical

Target Type
(IV)

● GTD

● Ratio

● Targets

Group
Lifespan (IV)

● End of
Terror
Dataset

● Interval

● Lifespan
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